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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS E. HAMILTON,
Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, KENNETH J. PINNEY,
doing business as PINNEY BEVERAGE COMPANY, and PROVO
CITY BASEBALL CLUB, a partnership,

Case No.
7650

Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appellant brought this action against the Respondents above named in the District Court of Salt Lake
County to recover damages for injuries received by her
by reason of her having been struck by a baseball on
the 9th day of July, 1947, during a game then being
played in Derk's Field between a baseball team known
as the Pinney Beverage Company Team and the Provo
City Baseball Team.·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prior to this appeal, upon Plaintiff's motion the
action was dismissed as to Defendant Kenneth J. Pinney,
doing business as Pinney Beverage Company and the
Defendant Provo City Baseball Club, leaving the Defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation the sole Respondent herein. (R-6)
Appellant alleged in her Complaint as follows:
"2. That prior to the 9th day of July, 1947,
the Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation, constructed a baseball park, together with a grandstand for the use of spectators, and other facilities, on land owned by it in Salt Lake City,
Utah, known as 'Derk's Field' or 'Derk's Ball
Park,' and on and prior to the said 9th day of
July, 1947, the said Defendant City has owned
and operated said park, in its proprietary capacity, said Defendant City sharing the proceeds
from the operation and use of said park in the
staging of baseball games and other sports events,
being played and held therein from time to time,
including the proceeds of the baseball game hereinafter specifically referred to.
"3. That on the 9th day of July, 1947, while
said park .was being jointly operated, controlled,
used and maintained by all of the Defendants,
Plaintiff paid admission for, and attended a baseball game being played in said Park, that had
been advertised publicly by the Defendants, by
and between a baseball team known as 'Pinney
Beverage Baseball Team,' owned and controlled
by the Defendant, Kenneth J. Pinney, and the
'Provo Baseball Team,' owned and controlled by
the Defendant, Provo City Baseball Club.
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'~.t.

That Plaintiff, upon entering the stands
of said Derk's Field, selected a seat about 15 feet
behind and in the center of the screened portion of
the grandstand, \Yhich she considered and
assumed to be, and \Yhieh she selected as being,
in a place of safety, and \vhere she could not be
injured by batted or thrown balls. That during
the fourteenth inning of said baseball game, one
of the Pinney Beverage Company ball players hit
a foul ball which went over the said screen in
front of said grandstand, and struck claimant on
the base of her neck, fracturing the spinus process of her sixth and seventh cervical vertabrae,
causing her excruciating pain and suffering, and
permanent injuries and damages, as hereinafter
more specifically set forth.

"5. That said Defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation was negligent in its construction and
maintenance of the said Derk's Field, and in
authorizing and permitting the use thereof while
not having a screen in front of said grandstand,
and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height, or of
sufficient overhead covering, so as to prevent
batted balls from going over said screen and
striking Plaintiff, and the said Defendants, Kenneth J. Pinney and the Provo City Baseball Club,
were likewise negligent in using said field in its
dangerous condition, which said facts were well
known to said Defendants, or should have been
known to them, in the exercise of reasonable care,
and in permitting Plaintiff to be injured by a
batted ball, after being lulled into a sense of
security by reason of said screen. That the negligence of the Defendants, and each of them, as
aforesaid, proximately caused Plaintiff's said
. . .
InJUries.
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"6. That Plaintiff has been caused to suffer
great pain and shock, and she will continue to
suffer great pain and shock, and she has been
totally disabled from performing her household
and other duties, and will be so disabled for a
long period of time, and Plaintiff is informed, and
upon information and belief alleges, that the
injuries received by her will be permanent in
character, and she will be permanently disabled
for the rest of her lifetime, ·all to her general
damage in the sum of ,$25,000.00, and by reason
of Plaintiff's injuries, as aforesaid, she has, to
date hereof, incurred. the following expenses: A
brace for her back and neck, at a cost of $175.00,
and doctor and medical expenses in the sum of
over $400.00.
"7. That within the time, and as provided by
law, Plaintiff caused a claim, in writing, properly
itemized and described and verified as to correctness, to be presented to the Defendant, Salt
Lake City Corporation, setting forth the particulars hereinabove set forth, and claiming
damages, as aforsaid, and said Defendant City
has wholly failed to audit and allow the same.
"WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays Judgment
against the Defendant, and each of them, both
jointly and severally, for the sum of $175.00, the
cost of said brace for her back and neck, the sum
of $400.00, doctor and medical expenses, and the
sum of $25,000.00 general damages, for her costs
of suit herein expended, and for such other and
further relief as is just and proper." (R-1)
The Respondent filed a general and special Demurrer to Appellant's Complaint, which said Demurrers were
argued and overruled by the Court. The Respondent
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filed its .A.ns"'"er ad1nitting that Respondent ·Salt Lake
City constructed the Baseball Park and Grandstand· for
the use of spectators, on land O\Yned by it, known as
Derk's Field, but denied all other allegations of Appellant's Complaint.
. A. s a further Answer to the Complaint, Respondent
alleged that if Appellant was injured as alleged in her

Complaint, that her injury was proximately contributed
to and caused by her own negligence .in failing to keep
a proper lookout for the ball; in failing to use reasonable
care and circumspection in attending to her own safety;
in failing to do anything to protect herself or to avoid
being hit by said ball after she knew, or by the exercise
of reasonable care should have known, said ball was
likely to go over the screen and fall in the vicinity where
she was sitting.
Respondent further alleged that the height and character of the screen in front of the grandstand where
Appellant claimed she was sitting when injured was at
all times open and visible and its height and character
readily discernable by Appellant, and the fact that foul
balls could be batted over the screen and fall in the
grandstand was as readily perceivable to her as to Responden~,

and that Appellant chose said seat and re-

mained in said seat assuming whatever risk of injury
would be encountered in the ordinary and usual course
of the game of baseball then being played, well knowing
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the height and character of the screen in front of her
and the extent of the protection such screen would
afford. (R-4)
The case came on for pre-trial before the Court and
from the pleadings in the cause and statements of
counsel the Trial Court, Judge J. Allan Crockett presiding, made its Findings and Order as follows:
"This matter having come before the Court
for pre-trial, Plaintiff appearing by and through
Oscar W. Moyle, Jr., of the firm of l\{oyle & Moyle,
her attorneys, the Defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation appearing by and through E. Ray Christensen, Homer Holmgren, and A. Pratt Kesler,
its attorneys, and the Defendant, Kenneth J.
Pinney appearing by and through E. R. Callister,
of the firm of Callister, Callister & Lewis, his
attorneys, and from the pleadings in this cause,
and statements of counsel, the Court makes its
Findings and Order as follows:
"1. That the Defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation, is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the Laws
of the State of Utah.
"2. That prior to July 9, 1947, Defendant
constructed a baseball park with grandstand and
bleachers and other facilities for use of spectators
on land owned by it, said park being known as
'Derk's Field'. That in constructing said baseball
park Defendant City erected a mesh wire screen
immediately in front of the front seats of said
grandstand and about thirty-five feet behind the
home plate of the baseball diamond in said park,
said screen being thirty-two feet high and one
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hundred fifty feet long, the center thereof being
immediately behind said home plate. Said screen
'vas erected by Defendant City to afford protection to spectators vie,ving baseball games from
batted and thro""n baseballs that otherwise would
enter that portion of the stand behind the screen.
Photographs of said screen and stand are introduced in evidence as exhibits 1, 2, and 3.

"3. For the purpose of this Pre-trial proceeding the Court finds that prior to July 9, 1947,
and after the construction of said park as above
described, Defendant City leased the said park
to two baseball teams, one sponsored by Pinney
Beverage Company, and one by Provo City Baseball Club, for use by them for baseball games on
certain scheduled days when the park was not
otherwise in use. That by the terms of said lease
said ball teams were to pay to Defendant City
as rental seven and a half per cent of the gross
income from the sale of admission tickets, and for
a license to conduct concessions, such as sale of
refreshments, soft drinks, beer, and other articles,
at said park said teams were to pay seven and a
half per cent of the gross income from such concessions. It was further agreed that said teams
would collect for Defendant City five cents upon
each admission ticket to the game. Should this
Order of dismissal be reversed on Appeal, then
either party may offer additional evidence on the
matters in this paragraph 3.
"4. That on July 9, 1947, Plaintiff paid
admission for and attended a baseball game being
played by said Pinney Beverage Company team
and Provo City Baseball Club team, which game
had been publically advertized.
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"5. That·· Plaintiff, upon entering the stands
of said 'Derk's Field', and desiring and intending
to view said game from a place of safety, selected
a seat about 15 feet behind and in the center of
the screened portion of the grandstand, which
she considered and assumed to be, and which she
selected as being in· a place of safety, where she
could not be injured by batted or thrown balls.
That during the fourteenth inning of said baseball
gan1e one of the Pinney Beverage Company ball
players hit a foul ball, which went up over the
said screen in front of said grandstand and came
down inside said screen and struck claimant on
the base and back of her neck, causing her serious
and substantial damage.
"6. That Plaintiff claims in this case that
Salt Lake City Corporation was negligent in its
construction and ·maintenance of the Ball Park,
and in authorizing and permitting the use thereof
while not having a screen in front of said grandstand and Plaintiff's seat, of sufficient height or
of sufficient overhead covering so as to prevent
batted .balls from going over said screen and
striking Plaintiff, and in permitting Plaintiff to
be injured by a batted ball after being lulled into
a sense of security by reason of the screen; and
that the negligence of the Defendant City proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries.
"7. That Plaintiff further claims that in
the operation of said Ball Park, it was the duty of
the City to have a reasonable number of protected
seats so that those patrons, including Plaintiff,
who desired a protected seat, could select ·such a
protected seat, where they, and she, would be in
a place of safety and a place where they, and she,
would be protected from injury.
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"8. That Defendant City claims the City
had discharged any duty it owed to Plaintiff in
the premises by constructing and providing the
screen above described; that the height and character of said screen in front of the granstand
"""here Plaintiff was sitting when injured, was at
all times open and visible and its height and
character were as readily discernable by Plaintiff
as by the Defendant City, and the fact that foul
balls could be batted over said screen and fall in
the grandstand was as readily perceivable to
Plaintiff as to the Defendant City, and that
Plaintiff was equally aware thereof, as was Defendant City, and that Plaintiff chose her seat
and remained in said seat, assuming whatever
risk of injury would be encountered in the ordinary and usual course of the game of baseball
then being played, well knowing the height and
character of the screen in front of her, and the
extent of the protection the screen would afford.
"9. That on August 12, 1947, Plaintiff presented to and filed with Defendant City a written
claim as set out in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto.
That Defendant City has failed to audit and
allow said claim.

"10. The Court finds as a matter of Law
that in so far as Defendant City was under any
legal obligation to furnish protection to Plaintiff
as a patron at said ball game Defendant City
discharged such duty by providing the protective
screen described in paragraph two hereof, and
Defendant City was not guilty of any negligence
in the premises toward Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff, as a matter of Law, assumed any risk because
of inadequate protection to spectators.
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"11. The Court concludes that Plaintiff's
complaint should be dismissed no cause of action,
the Plaintiff to have her exceptions to these
Findings and Order.
"BY ORDER OF THE COURT made this
28th day of December 1950.
"J. ALLAN CROCKETT
Judge"
"ORDER"
"Upon the above Findings and Order, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff's complaint . be, and the same hereby is, dismissed
without prejudice.
"BY ORDER OF THE COURT made this
28th day of December 1950.
"J. ALLAN CROCKETT
Judge"
(R-7)

From the Order made and entered as aforesaid,
dismissing her Complaint, Appellant has taken this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING RESPONDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISCHARGED IT'S DUTY
TO APPELLANT BY FURNISHING THE SCREEN DESCRIBED IN THE FINDINGS ON PRE-TRIAL.
1.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW ASSUMED THE
RISK OF THE INJURIES RECEIVED BY HER.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS COMPLAINT.
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY TRIAL DEMANDED.

There are two main issues raised by Appellant's
appeal in this case:
1. Did Respondent, as a matter of law, discharge
its duty to the Appellant as a patron at said ball game
by providing the screen described in the above Findings J? (R-7-10)
2. Did Appellant, as a matter of law, assume the
risk of the inadequacy of the protection when, as found
by the Court she, desiring and intending to view the
game from a place of safety, selected a seat about
fifteen feet behind and in the center of the screened
portion of the grandstand, which she considered and
assumed to be, and which she selected as being in a
place of safety where she could not be injured by batted
or thrown balls~ (R-8-10)
These issues raise the questions as to the duty of
the owner and operator of a baseball park to protect its
patrons, and the duty of the patrons and spectators
with regard to their own safety.
THE ARGUMENT
DID RESPONDENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DISCHARGE ITS DUTY BY FURNISHING THE SCREEN FURNISHED.
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There are many cases where the Appellate Courts of
the various states have been called upon to p.ass upon
some phase of the duty imposed upon the owner and the
assumption of risk on the part of the spectator. The
general rule drawn from a careful study of the cases is
that the owners and operators of baseball parks, in
view of the dangers to spectators from thrown or batted
balls, owe a duty of providing seats protected by screens
or otherwise for as many patrons as may be reasonably
expected to call for such seats on an ordinary day of
reasonable attendance, and that a breach of this duty
may constitute_ negligence making the owner or operator
answerable in damages to a patron who is injured by
reason of the failure to provide such protection. Said
general rule is stated in 52 Am. Jur. page 309 as follows:
"In view of the dangers to spectators at
baseball games from thrown or batted balls, the
duties of owners and operators of ball parks to
exercise care commensurate with the circumstances for the protection of their patrons include
the duty of providing seats protected by screens
or otherwise for as many patrons as may be
reasonably expected to call for such seats on an
ordinary day of reasonable attendance, and the
breach ·of this duty may constitute negligence
making the owner or management answerable in
damages to a patron who is injured by reason of
the failure to provide such prote.ction. The duty
of providing such protection is not satisfied where
the screening provided contains holes or is otherwise so defective as to provide no stop for
flying balls."
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Probably the leading and n1ost cited case propounding the general rule referred to in A1n. Jttlr. Supra, is
the case of Crane vs. Kainsas City Baseball & Exhibition
Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S. W. 1076, which we quote
from as follows:
HDefendants were not insurers of the safety of
spectators; but, being engaged in the business of
providing a public entertainment for profit, they
were bound to exercise reasonable care, i.e., care
commensurate to the circumstances of the situation
to protect their patrons against injury. King. v.
Ringling, 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S. W. 482; Murriel v. Smith, 152 Mo. App. 95, 133 S. W. 76. In
view of the facts that the general public is invited
to attend these games, that hard balls are thrown
and batted with great force and swiftness, and
that such balls often go in the direction of spectators, we think the duty of defendants towards
their patrons included that of providing seats
protected by screening from wildly thrown or
foul balls, for the use of patrons who desired
such protection."
Following the Crane case, the same Court in the
case of Edling vs. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition

Co., 181 Mo. App. 327, 168 S. W. 908,. affirmed the same
rule, and in holding the owner of a baseball park liable
for injuries to a patron where a foul ball passed through
a large hole that had been worn in the netting and struck
the patron in the face while seated in the screened-in
portion of the stand beyond the catcher's box, the
Court said:
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"Defendant recognized this duty by screening that part of the grand stand most exposed to
the battery of foul balls, and impliedly assured
spectators who paid admission to the grand stand
that seats behind the screen were reasonably protected. None of those seats were closed to patrons, and when plaintiff entered the grand stand
he was invited to seat himself where he pleased,
with the assurance that reasonable care had been
observed for his protection. It was the duty of
defendant to exercise reasonable care to keep
the screen free from defects, and, if it allowed it
to become old, rotten, and perforated with holes
larger than a ball, the jury were entitled to infer
that it did not properly perform that duty, but
was guilty of negligence.
"In seating himself where he did plaintiff
did not assume the risks resulting from such
negligence."
S·ee also Quinn vs. Recreation Park Association,
3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 Pac. 2d 144, at page 146 of the Pacific
report of the case: "The duty imposed by law is performed when screened seats are provided for as many
as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any
ordinary occasion." And the cases cited in the
Annotation appearing at 142 L. R. A. at page 868.
Appellant takes the position that the Respondent
did not, as a matter of law, discharge the duty placed
upon it to provide a reasonable number of screened seats;
in fact, it did not provide any seats that were reasonably
protected from foul balls for persons who desired such
protection, as did Appellant. Certainly, if a patron
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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selects a seat in a grandstand, in the center, and within
15 feet of the screen, and that person can still be struck
by a foul ball, the operator of the park has not furnished
any seats that are reasonably safe, and certainly not so
as a matter of la"'"· The sufficiency of the protection
afforded . A._ppellant under all of the surrounding circumstances was a question of fact to be determined by
the jury, not one of law.
Under the uniform holding of all of the baseball
cases, it is necessary to furnish a reasonable number of
safe seats for the use of patrons who desire such protection, and here, under the express findings of the Court
upon the pre-trial, Appellant desired such protection,
the Court having found that Appellant "desiring and
intending to view said game from a place of safety,
selected a seat about 15 feet behind and in the center
of the screened portion of the grandstand which she
considered and assumed to be, and which she selected
as being in a place of safety where she could not be
injured by batted or thrown balls."
The Trial Court was clearly in error in finding that
as a matter of law, in so far as Respondent was under
any legal obligation to furnish protection to Appellant, it
discharged such duty by providing the screen described
in said Findings, and that as a matter of law, Respondent
was not guilty of any negligence in the premises toward
Appellant. This brings us to the question as to whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or not Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed any risk
because of inadequate protection to her under the existing facts as disclosed by the Findings upon the pre-trial.
DID APPELLANT AS A MATTER OF LAW ASSUME
THE RISK OF THE INADEQUACY OF THE PROTECTION
FURNISHED?

If the Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed the
risk of being struck by the ball that struck her, she
certainly did so without so intending. The express
finding is that she desired and intended to view the
game from a place of safety, and that she selected the
seat as being in a place of safety where she could not be
injured by batted or thrown balls. There is nothing in
the Findings of the Trial Court on pre-trial upon which
the Order of Dismissal is based that would indicate that
Appellant had any reason to believe that she would or
might be struck by a ball fouled from home plate over
the screen and into the vicinity of her seat. In fact, as
stated, the express Finding of the Trial Court was that
she considered herself to be. in a place of safety.
Appellant admits that where a patron voluntairly
selects a seat in an unscreened portion of the grand stand
at a baseball game, that the cases show a strong tendency
toward holding that the patron assumes the risk of being
struck by a ball, at least where the patron has knowledge
of the game, unless some unusual circumstances exist,
such as where, in the case of Grimes vs. American
League Baseball Company, 78 S.W. 2d. 520, the Missouri
Court of Appeals sustained a judgm~nt for a patron
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"There the ball struck a temporary box that had been
placed on the playing field, and the ball was deflected into
the unscreened stand and struck the patron, the Court
holding that the construction of boxes within the playing
field, created an unusual and extroardinary hazard; and
in the case of Cincinnati Baseball Club vs. Eno, Supra,
in which case the Court held that it was a question of
fact for the Jury to determine whether or not the management of the Baseball Club, in permitting practice
by its baseball team in close proximity to the unscreened
section of the grand stand between the two games of a
double header, was guilty of negligence, and also a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not a spectator
sitting in the unscreened portion of the grand stand at
the time of the practicing, was guilty of contributory
negligence or assumed the risk of injury.
The theory or basis for holding that, as a matter of
law, a patron assumes the risk of injury by selecting a
seat in an unscreened portion of the stand is that the
spectator has knowledge of the dangers incident to the
playing of the game and therefore, assumes the risk of
being injured in such a seat regardless of the question
of negligence on the part of the operator, and in those
cases in which the Courts have refused recovery where
the spectator denied actual knowledge of the danger, it
was held the circumstances surrounding the attendance
were such, and the game of baseball so commonly known,
that knowledge was imputed to him. This imputed knowledge of danger precluding recovery when struck while
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voluntarily sitting in an unscreened portion of the stand
would certainly not be the same as imputing that knowledge to the spectator who has voluntarily and intentionally selected the safest seat that he is able to find, in a
portion of the stand considered by him to be in a place
of safety. The very erection and existence of the screen
impliedly assures spectators that the seats immediately
behind the same ar~ reasonably protected. Certainly
there can be no implication of such protection when
sitting in an unscreened portion of the stand.
As stated in the Edling case, Supra: "Defendant
recognized this duty by screening that part of the grand
stand most exposed to the battery of foul balls, and
impliedly assured spectators who paid admission to the
grand stand that seats behind the screen were reasonably
protected. None of those seats were closed to patrons,
and when Plaintiff entered the grand stand he was
invited to seat himself where he pleased, with the assurance that reasonable care had been observed for
his protection."
In refusing to apply the doctrine of implying common knowledge of the game and its incidental dangers
and of assumed risk as a matter of law in baseball cases
where struck by a ball while in an unscreened portion of
the stand to a hockey game, the Supreme Court of the
State of Nebraska, after carefully considering the baseball, former hockey and other amusement cases, in the
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case of Tite vs. Omaha Coliseum Corp. 12 N. W. 2d. 90,
149 A. L. R. 1164, at page 1171 of the A. L. R. report
of the case states:
''Seemingly the tendency of the courts is to
hold that in all baseball cases involving injuries
to spectators from balls going into the unscreened
stands from the playing field the question of
knowledge, either actual or constructive, is one
of law for the courts. While in some cases there
was evidence that would show knowledge, the
courts in deciding that the spectator had knowledge as a matter of law emphasized the fact that
there is a common knowledge of baseball and its
incidental dangers. This common kno~ledge
seems to have been the deciding factor in causing
the courts to view the question as one of law for
the court rather than one of fact for the jury.
The distinction which appellant perceives in baseball cases does not show a different rule of substantive law as respects the duties of the operator
or spectator. It merely shows establishment of
knowledge of dangers which precludes recovery
is arrived at in a different manner."
Appellant contends that the doctrine of implied risk
as a matter of law should not be extended to cover the
factual situation existing in the case at bar, and particularly so in the face of the affirmative finding by the
Trial Court that Appellant selected the seat 15 feet
behind the screen considering the same to be in a place
of safety and where she could not be injured by batted
or thrown balls. This Finding of the Trial Court is
entirely contrary to the presuming of knowledge that
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she was voluntarily choosing a place of danger. The
reasons behind applying the assumed risk doctrine to a
spectator voluntarily selecting a seat in an open portion
of the stand do not in any way apply to a patron who
selects a seat behind the screen for the express purpose
of placing herself in a position of safety. Certainly, at
the most, it would be for the jury, which had been
demanded by Appellant in this cause, to determine the
question of whether -or not, _under all of the circumstances, she assumed the risk of receiving the injuries
she received, and not a question of law for the Trial
Court to determine.
WHEREFORE, Appellant submits that the Court
erred: First, in finding as a matter of law that Respondent was not guilty of any negligence; and Second, that
Appellant, as a matter of law, assumed any risk because
of inadequate protection to her ; and respectfully requests
that the Order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint be reversed, and this cause be remanded to the Trial Court for
trial upon its merits before a jury.
OSCAR W. MOYLE, JR.,
Of the Firm of Moyle & Moyle
Attorneys for Appellant
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